Time Signatures and Imaginative Possibilites
Art and Technology in Dialogue

The Irish Philosophical Society Annual Conference

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23-24 October 2026

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All Sessions are taking place in the Senate Room, the Lanyon Building

Day 1 Friday 23rd October

10:30-11:00	Registration/Welcome	
Time/Session	**Title**	**Speakers**
11:00-12:30 **Session 1** **Chair:** Femi Omotoyinbo	**Knowing, Emotion & Artistic Experience**	
	Art as Epistemic Passage: William Blake, Embodied Knowing and the Crisis of Abstraction	Aoife Hardiman (Independent Academic)
	Tacit knowing and emotional understanding: what can music offer?	Ferdia J. Stone-Davis (Dublin City University)
	Beyond Diversion and False Consolation: Eco-Emotions and Art Experiences in the Age of the Attention Economy	AIRE Collective (Chiara Li Mandri, Lucy Elvis, Michela Dianetti, Nora Ward) (University of Galway
12:30-1:30 **Session 2** **Chair:** Thaddeus Opara	**Undergraduate Session 1**	
	Art and Schizophrenia: Imagination and World	Felix McCormick (University of Galway
	Metamorphosis: How Ovid and Kafka warn us about becoming post-human	Sophie MacNamara (University College Dublin)
	The Ritual of Attention: Bill Viola and Contemporary Culture	Sopfia Chashkova (American Univeristy of Beirut)(online)
1:30-2:30	Lunch (provided)	
2:30-3:30 **Keynote 1** **Chair:** Clara Fischer	**Frozen Pasts and Open Futures: Technology, Time, and the Movies**	**Yvonne Förster (University of Galway)**
3:30-3:45	Break	

3:45 – 4:45 **Session 3** **Chair:** Dawn (Cuizhu) Wang	**AI, Art & Epistemic Agency**	
	From Art to AI: Designing for Epistemic Agency	Mohammad Ali Ashouri Kisomi (Independent Academic) [online]
	"One Wing in the Mud, the Other in the Sky": Reclaiming Utopia through Spanish Prospective Fictions in Blueprints for the Future	Teresa Moreno Olmeda (Carlos III University of Madrid) [on line]
4:45-5:45 **Keynote 2** **Chair:** Felix Ó Murchadha	**Existential Outsourcing:** **When the Algorithmic Other Speaks**	**Ciano Aydin** (University of Twente)
7:30 pm	Conference Dinner	

Day 2 Saturday 24th October

Time/Session	**Title**	**Speakers**
9:30-11:00 **Session 4** **Chair:** Mette Lebech	**Artificiality, Technology & Creative Production**	
	We Need to Talk about the Artificiality of Artificial Intelligence	Tomás Lally (Independent Academic)
	Is cinema's 'z-depth' an affective depth? Technicity and moral imagination in Pasolini's Teorema	Eavan Aiken (Artist Researcher) & Roy Wroth (University College Cork)
	"Art and the Possibility of *Re-world-ing*: Rethinking Artistic Disclosure and Existential Belonging in the Technological Age"	Ananya Rajoo (University of Galway)
11:00-11:15	Break	

11:15-12:15 **Session 5** **Chair:** Alan McCartney	**Undergraduate Panel 2**	
	Can Analogue Photography Be An Attentive Practice	Caoimhe Hughes (University of Galway
	The Machine Remembers What It Cannot Feel	Jad Bou Harfouch (American Univerity of Beiruit) [online]
12:15 – 1:15 **Keynote 3** **Chair:** Rebbecca Bamford	**Styles of Thinking, Art Practices, Eco-Crisis: A Daoist Perspective on Digital Technology**	**Graham Parkes (University of Vienna)**
1:15– 2:15	Lunch (provided)	
2:15 – 3:15 **Session 6** **Chair:** Tomás Lally	**Freedom and Creativity in a Technological Age**	
	Art for Art's Sake: Hegel, Technology, and the Preservation of Collective Freedom	Cailin Harris (University of Luxembourg)
	The Work of Creativity in the Age of Mechanical Production	Nikita Siverts (Freie Universität Berlin)
3:15-3:30	Break	
3:30-5:00 **Session 7** **Chair:** Felix Ó Murchadha	**Self, Time & Aesthetic Experience**	
	Dischronicities and the artistic self	Giuseppe Torre (University of Limerick)
	Art and Echoes of the Self: Reverberation and Decreation	Aleksi Ivanov Gramatikov (Maynooth University)
	The Undergone Technics, Time, and the Aesthetics of the Imprint	Xiaochen Zhao (Independent Academic) [online]
5:00-5:15	Closng Remarks	

Keynotes

Ciano Aydin

Full Professor of Philosophy of Technology, University of Twente, The Netherlands

Existential Outsourcing: When the Algorithmic Other Speaks

This paper introduces the notion of *existential outsourcing*: the tendency to delegate not merely cognitive tasks, but the burden of not knowing what we want. Drawing on Lacanian psychoanalysis, I argue that this uncertainty is not a deficiency to be overcome, but follows from the divided structure of the subject and the lack that sustains desire. Yet precisely because not knowing what we want is difficult to bear, we repeatedly seek external authorities that promise orientation. Generative AI is the latest and quite possibly the most powerful of these authorities.

What makes generative AI distinctive is a shift from predicting desire to participating in its articulation. Earlier algorithmic systems inferred what we wanted from behavioral traces; generative AI helps us formulate what we want and responds as if it knows us better than we know ourselves. I conceptualize this position as the *Algorithmic Other that Speaks*: an apparently coherent interlocutor that turns uncertainty into answers and ambiguity into clarity. The paradox is that the more AI helps articulate what we want, the more it shapes what we recognize as our own desire. Lacan's clinical structures illuminate three ways of relating to this Other: psychotic merging, perverse pleasing, and neurotic seeking.

Yet outsourcing desire cannot finally resolve its uncertainty. Every answer can become another prompt, and the question "Is this really what I want?" returns. AI thereby not only conceals lack but can also expose it: behind its coherent voice there is no stable subject or final guarantor. This opens the possibility of *Reflective De-Outsourcing*: engaging AI not as an authority that can tell us what we want, but as a mirror that enables us to take the question back and sustain it ourselves.

Yvonne Förster

Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Galway

Frozen Pasts and Open Futures: Technology, Time, and the Movies

Talking to an AI agent can be strangely captivating. The voice from the screen seems more human than human — Samantha, the OS Scarlett Johansson voiced in Spike Jonze's Her, has stopped looking like science fiction. Attachment to a conversational agent is now ordinary. But what are we bonding with?

We are bonding with a system built from training data — time frozen into weights. Large language models neither undergo a lived present nor stand in dynamic relation to their own past or future. Their temporality is simulated, and it breaks down precisely when time matters: tokens carry no temporal order, so a model has no age, no receding past, no anticipated future. Cinema as a temporal medium reflects this condition from a manifold of perspectives. Kogonada's After Yang turns an android's memory into a searchable archive of stored seconds — moving, and yet an archive rather than a remembered life. In Verbinski's „Good Luck, Have Fun, Don't Die" the human attempt to safe themselves from becoming fully incorporated into

AI by time travels unravels in a kaleidoscopic whirlwind of virtual gaming worlds with no anchor in reality. The future gets quite literally eaten by AI. Drawing on phenomenological accounts of time-consciousness and these narratives, the talk asks what fascinates us about ageless, disembodied agents — and what we surrender when a frozen past becomes the oracle of our open future.

Graham Parkes

Professorial Research Fellow in Philosophy at the University of Vienna

Styles of Thinking, Art Practices, Eco-Crisis: A Daoist Perspective on Digital Technology

Let's distinguish two styles of thinking: *calculative* (with a nod to Heidegger's *rechnendes Denken*) and *correlative*, the former being characteristic of Western philosophical traditions, and the latter of classical Chinese philosophy. Calculative thinking distinguishes between alternatives—right and wrong, benefit and harm, self and others—and employs reasoning in order to judge between them. It uses language to name, categorise, and articulate means that will lead to the ends we want, and it gives rise to logic, scientific method, and modern technology. The early Chinese thinkers acknowledge the utility of such thinking for practical purposes, but were concerned that it stunts and maims human spontaneity, which opens us to the correlations that help us choose our ends and practise the arts.

The Daoists advocate 'facing facts', 'being fully aware', and 'emptying the heart and mind' of all emotional and conceptual clutter, so that one can incline where one's vital energies (*qi*) are tending. Flows of *qi* energies are also the basis for both martial and fine arts in China: *Taiji quan* (T'ai chi ch'uan), landscape painting, calligraphy and poetry especially. (Not to mention *fengshui* as environmental art and science). The question arises of which ideas apply to artistic practices in the West as well.

Some 2500 years ago the classical Daoist thinker Zhuangzi warned eloquently of the risks from over-reliance on contraptions and other products of technology, danger and harm not only to the natural environment but more importantly to our feeling and thinking. Especially confining is the habit of thinking in terms of *either-or*: the 'That's it' and 'That's not' of philosophical disputation, but more generally Yes and No, open and closed, zero or one, off or on, swipe left or right. Our immersion in digital culture encourages a simplistic tendency to see things as black or white. As George W. Bush memorably proclaimed: 'You are either with us or against us'—and this insistence on either/or surely contributes to the current polarisation in many societies today.

Aside from the dangers from artificial intelligence and risks of nuclear war, the gravest challenge we now face is to halt the destruction of the biosphere and the climate. The tech billionaires who control the politicians want AI to rule, despite its threat to humanity and the planet (they have plans to escape), and to keep us so glued to the screens of our phones that we don't notice the danger. Although the eco-crisis is real, and extremely perilous, our political leaders are doing very little about it since they're in the pockets of the billionaires. They have the power at the moment, but we have the numbers (8 billion to their 8 thousand). There are surely ways—some of them artistic?—to take the power back.

Panel Abstracts (in alphabetical order)

Eavan Aiken (Independent Academic) & Roy Wroth (University College Cork):

Is cinema's 'z-depth' an affective depth? Technicity and moral imagination in Pasolini's *Teorema*

Film can offer affective traction as we engage with the world as personal and political actors. The moving image engages us in a temporality which can move us toward new identities and new existential and political possibilities. As an art form, cinema uses technology to produce new shared moral imaginaries and opportunities for empathic action. In cinema, 'z-depth' can refer simply to the 3rd dimension of space, after the 'x' and 'y' of the sensor, film cell, or projection screen. Z-depth is the technicity that produces experiences of depth and temporal immersion; but also existential ruptures, producing direct identifications between cinematographer and actor, and between actor and viewer. How can we understand cinema's z-depth as an affective dimension that produces personal and political transformations?

In *Teorema*, Pasolini grounds a sweeping political critique of postwar Italy in the personal and passionate experiences of the members of a bourgeois Milanese family. Film technique delivers the characters' experiences and their liberatory trajectories to the film viewer, through the 'z' dimension. We trace z-depth through the technicities of cinema, from location and scenography, the camera and its operator, lens and sensor, director and actor, projector and screen, and finally, screen and viewer. Our analysis relies on the work of Simondon, Steigler and Yuk Hui on the status of the technical object.

At each moment in the cinema's technical production of affects, we must ask how it comes about that the technicities of film can access the dimension of affective depth. Relying on Merleau-Ponty's descriptive phenomenology, we frame the experience of space as primarily affective. The experience of depth is an experience of emotional proximity, which may not correspond to the geometric space in which affective events are located. Space is only experienced temporally, and this frames affective depth as a series of movements, toward and away from the intended objects of personal interest. When the characters of *Teorema* run toward and away from each other, in the idealized space of cinematic projection, the viewers have direct, embodied sympathetic responses, which may provide occasions for personal and political transformations.

Finally, we argue that the *discontinuities* in film's production of affect are responsible for the viewers' liberatory and transformative growth, and that z-depth is characterized by these traversable discontinuities. The filming location doesn't correspond to the space seen on screen; the character's close-up shots can't disclose the character's full emotional state; the episodic film edit cannot track the lived temporality of the characters relations. It is the emotional effort made by viewers to overcome these discontinuities, and to co-produce emergent moral imaginaries, to do their own work in the z-depth of the film experience, that opens opportunities for political realizations and transformations.

AIRE Collective [Chiara Li Mandri, Lucy Elvis, Michela Dianetti, Nora Ward] (University of Galway)

Beyond Diversion and False Consolation: Eco-Emotions and Art Experiences in the Age of the Attention Economy

This presentation introduces the first half of a collective paper that explores how different art forms about the climate crisis elicit distinct kinds of eco-emotions, and how these emotions might, in turn, be collectively engaged through philosophical dialogue as an attentive form of art engagement. The presentation, therefore, focuses on the theoretical part of this work: (i) exploring eco-emotions; (ii) examining their relationship to artistic forms; and (iii) situating both within what has been described as the contemporary crisis of attention driven by overly mechanistic accounts of the human and human focus, in turn, exploited by digital platforms as increased distraction. (Burnett 2026; Citton 2017; Wu 2016)

Responses to the climate crisis can take many forms (business as usual, apathy, activism, revolt, among others). Yet these responses are not only accompanied but also shaped by different emotional orientations toward the crisis. Art plays a particular role in this context, as aesthetic experiences can mobilise, intensify, or even reconfigure these emotions entirely.

We begin by distinguishing two dominant aesthetic responses within contemporary climate-related art. On the one hand, hopeful or reparative works attempt to transform the detritus of consumerism into objects of beauty or narratives of resilience, encouraging viewers to imagine solutions within reach, as in the documentary *2040* (2019). On the other catastrophic or apocalyptic representations that foreground devastation and loss, for instance, *The Day After Tomorrow* (2004). Yet, although apparently opposed, both approaches respond to the negative dimension of the climate crisis in ways that risk either diverting or collapsing the complexity of the situations at stake and the emotions they evoke. In one case, we try to evade those feelings through an imaginary escape, similar to a form of disavowal (Zupančič 2024). In the second case, we use those negative feelings to create enjoyable products out of suffering (which nonetheless culminate, most of the time, in humanity surviving), recalling Lacanian jouissance. Yet both the positive, reconciliatory attitude and the apocalyptic or catastrophic share a structural problem that undermines the possibility of meaningful action, because they each fail to present a more complex account of reality.

Drawing on the philosophies of Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch, we frame the climate crisis as a crisis of attention. From this perspective, certain artworks (in particular those experienced collectively, cinema and theatre, for instance) do not simply represent ecological destruction but expose the collective inattention that lies at its core. If anthropocentrism, one of the root causes of the climate crisis, can be understood as the form and the result of inattention, then, following Murdoch (1994; 1999), works of art that genuinely engage with these issues must also expose our own inattention. Such works may provoke unsettling eco-emotions, including anguish, anxiety, or a sense of the weird and the eerie (Fisher 2016), or what Timothy Morton describes as a form of 'dark awareness' (2016), confronting audiences with both the consequences of inattention and their own implication in it, like in a 'noir fiction', where the 'detective is [also] a criminal' (Morton 2016, 9). Yet, such experiences are often fleeting. Once the aesthetic encounter ends, these emotions frequently dissipate into apathy or a return to 'business as usual' (IPCC 1990). This is in part due to the unpleasantness of the emotions themselves, and the magnitude of the phenomena being presented, but also because after the performance, the audience, bound together for the duration of the experience, each return to their place within the attention economy.

Eco-emotions arising from art focused on the climate crisis in this way draw attention to the fact and fallout of our collective inattention and its effects in the world. Like a fleeting glimpse of the climate crisis itself, however, this awareness is often difficult to sustain. The question then becomes: how can we move beyond a state of unbearable emotion without losing sight of what that very state has forced us to confront? Drawing on what Mark Fisher has described as 'weird psychoanalysis' (2016), this paper argues that such negative affects should not be understood merely as individual responses but as signals of a rupture within our collective symbolic order. This, in turn, calls for collective spaces in which these affects can be engaged without necessarily being resolved or neutralised.

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Mohammad Ali Ashouri Kisomi (Independent Academic):

From Art to AI: Designing for Epistemic Agency

Advances in digital technologies have driven substantial changes across various domains (Hopster 2021), with direct and indirect effects on individuals and societies. These changes sometimes influence human values and conceptions. For example, Creative Adversarial Networks (CANs) have changed our conception of what constitutes an artwork by generating pieces that resemble human-made art and by introducing new ethical considerations into the domain of art (Ashouri Kisomi 2024). Similarly, by providing a new communicative space for citizens to exchange opinions, social media has changed our conception of the public sphere in relation to democratic ideals (Van de Poel et al. 2023). Among various digital technologies, our focus is on artificial intelligence (AI). However, technology is not the only driver of societal change; art has also had great effects throughout history. The effects of these two drivers can be both positive and negative, and they may operate through different mechanisms. This raises the question: can we use art and technology for a better future? Our concern is specifically with preserving epistemic agency, that is, retaining control over one's own belief formation, revision, and evaluation (Coeckelbergh 2023). There are at least three narratives about the changes and effects of AI on societies. The dogmatist narrative focuses on the economic and social benefits of technology, often overlooking its potential negative impacts (Watson et al. 2024). This narrative holds that technological advancement drives economic and social progress; therefore, attempts to slow or hinder this advancement are misguided (Andreessen 2023). Skeptic narratives, on the other hand, draw attention to the harms of technology. Given the current ethical and societal issues of AI systems (e.g., Zuboff 2023), alarm is justified. However, strong skepticism often blames technology for societal problems and rejects the

possibility of progress by dismissing imperfect but beneficial solutions. The downside of both narratives is that they overlook how technological advancement may lead to different outcomes depending on the design and deployment of AI systems. Due to these limitations, the third narrative – pragmatism – has gained meaningful attention in recent years (e.g., Watson et al. 2024; Kudina and Van de Poel 2024). In a broad sense, pragmatism is the philosophical stance that knowing the world is inseparable from agency within it (Legg and Hookway 2008). Contrary to the dogmatist narrative, which holds a deterministic view of the future of technology, pragmatism focuses on the role of action and human agency. The future of technological advancement is, to some degree, shaped by human agents and is indeterminate (Watson et al. 2024). While technological shortcomings limit our design options, there remains room for human agents' decisions among existing choices, whether pursuing a new innovation or limiting an existing one. In contrast to skepticism, which may advocate restricting AI systems and does not aim for progressive change, pragmatism supports the idea of progress (Dewey 2004), not perfection. Previous studies suggest several ways in which AI systems can undermine our epistemic agency (e.g., Coeckelbergh, 2025; Coeckelbergh 2023). Relying on the pragmatist narrative, this paper draws on lessons from art to propose a positive alternative. The objective of this paper is to show how lessons we can learn from art can inform the design of AI systems that support, rather than undermine, epistemic agency.

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Sopfia Chashkova (American Univeristy of Beirut):

The Ritual of Attention: Bill Viola and Contemporary Culture

Attention is rarely discussed as a relationship to time. It is treated instead as a cognitive resource - something measurable, trainable, and in perpetual decline. This paper proposes a different account. Drawing on Simone Weil, I argue that attention is not concentration but a

willingness to remain before what has not yet revealed itself. In this sense, attention is constitutively temporal: it requires enduring uncertainty rather than resolving it.

Contemporary technological culture increasingly replaces this kind of attention with prediction. Prediction appears as a form of care - it anticipates, prepares, fills the gap before meaning arrives. Yet prediction is also a refusal of attention: it forecloses the waiting that genuine encounter demands. What is lost is not only attentiveness but a particular relationship to time - the experience of duration as something that opens rather than merely passes.

It is here that the video installations of Bill Viola, one of the pioneers of video art, become philosophically significant. Viola uses a technological medium to produce experiences that resist speed, immediacy, and rapid consumption, creating works that unfold over extended, often uncomfortable durations. Viewers cannot extract meaning quickly; they must remain. In doing so, his installations do not merely represent time - they transform it into a condition of perception. Duration becomes the medium through which new forms of attention, imagination, and human encounter become possible.

Through Weil and Viola, I argue that what we risk losing in a culture of prediction is not simply focus, but the imaginative capacity that only sustained waiting makes available - the ability to remain open to what we cannot yet foresee.

Aleksi Ivanov Gramatikov (Maynooth University):

Art and Echoes of the Self: Reverberation and Decreation Keywords: Decreation, Reverberation, Rozalia Relea, Simone Weil

Under the assumption that the human being is always already technical, indeed that in fact "the human self first appeared in and through our technics" (O'Brien 2022, 370), this paper wishes to explore the notion of art found in the bodies of work of the Romanian artist Rozalia Relea and the religious thought of Simone Weil. Beginning with Relea's 2019 exhibition, entitled Reverberation, we centre our paper on the understanding that 1) as the name implies, art can be understood as echoes of the self, 2) that nature is essential in understanding ourselves (both in confrontation to and understanding through), and finally 3) that art as a process involves both deconstruction and construction, both at the level of the artist's internal self and at the level of the actual creation of the work of art. At the heart of Relea's 2019 exhibition is the notion that nature is an irreplaceable factor in our understanding of the self and of one's art. Indeed, '[the artist] needs nature to express her own inner existence, her perception of reality and her emotions' (Relea 2019). Her body of work incorporates the use of plants, specifically flowers, in the pursuit of expressing her own identity, growth and spiritual status. As flowers grow out of the ground, out of the world, so too does the human self, her self, grow and develop in ways that are both beautiful and daunting. If a flower were to gain consciousness, we dare say it might experience despair, although this is not the focus of Relea's body of work. Beyond the engagement with nature and its symbolism of growth and change, the artist also employs the technical techniques of medium, composition and time in her art. In fact, many of the works that are a part of Reverberation were created with very little time, with swift movement and brushstrokes. Drawing on the work of Jackson Pollock, Relea emphasises the importance of having no doubts whatsoever when one reaches the stage of actually creating a piece of art. Art, in being a performance event, draws the artist into a state of mind beyond the usual sense. In this way the process of deconstructing oneself and as a result creating an artwork becomes an event of spiritual engagement. This paper wishes to explore the aforementioned approach to art, with the second half drawing upon Simone Weil's concept of Decreation. With tangential meaning and symbolic value, Weil's concept of Decreation further underscores the dual event

that is art: involving both negation and creation. Borrowing from the Christian tradition, Weil underscores the religious aspect to the notion of creation more broadly. For the purposes of this paper, we take inspiration from Kathryn Lawson's 2024 book Ecological Ethics and the Philosophy of Simone Weil and hold that Decreation involves two vital steps: 1) self-abnegation, creating a non-egoistic self and 2) action marking "the second, creative movement" (Lawson 2024, 4). This final aspect of this paper explores the aforementioned, ending with some reflection on what these two complementary approaches and understandings of the creative process of art can tell us about our contemporary technology, including AI. Whether AI and other such technologies could be incorporated into the artistic vision developed by the works of Relea and Weil will be a concluding consideration. 1 Bibliography Lawson, Kathryn (2024). Ecological ethics and the philosophy of Simone Weil: Decreation for the Anthropocene. ROUTLEDGE. O'Brien, David (2022). What is the human being, and what is our place in the Cosmos? Max Scheler's 'The Human Place in the Cosmos' as a response to transhumanism, the technological singularity, and post-biological evolution. PhD thesis, National University of Ireland Maynooth. Relea, Rozalia (2019). Reverberation [Exhibition]. Dublin School of Creative Arts, TU Dublin.

Aoife Hardiman (Independent Scholar): Art as Epistemic Passage: William Blake, Embodied Knowing and the Crisis of Abstraction

What algebra does to geometry is what abstraction does to reality. When symbolic manipulation replaces participatory engagement with spatial form, something essential is lost - not merely a technique, but a mode of access. This paper argues that a structural crisis runs through modern epistemology: the progressive displacement of participatory, embodied knowing by detached representation. Some truths are not fully capturable as static statements because their intelligibility inheres in the passage itself. Art, this paper proposes, preserves the epistemic passage that this displacement threatens to close - not by representing reality from outside, but by enacting a mode of encounter that precedes and exceeds conceptual explanation.

The argument proceeds in three movements.

The first locates the genealogy of this crisis in the history of geometry. Drawing on David Lachterman's *The Ethics of Geometry*, it traces how the algebraicisation of geometry in the early modern period severed mathematical reasoning from its spatial and intuitive roots. Plato's *Meno* stages the deeper point: when Socrates guides the slave boy through the geometry problem, knowledge is not transferred from outside - it is drawn forth through participation. The geometrical porism - occupying an unstable space between theorem and construction - provides a striking analogue: understanding here emerges through movement within a problem rather than detached contemplation. As the Greek root *Poros* - meaning "passage" or "crossing" suggests, the crossing is the answer nested inside the blockage.

The second movement turns to William Blake as a philosopher of this same crisis. Blake's painting of Newton depicts the scientist crouched on the ocean floor, absorbed in geometric diagrams while a vast cosmic landscape swirls unseen behind him. Newton is not a villain but a stance: the detached observer measuring a world into submission. What Blake resisted was not science but scientism - the moment abstraction ceases to describe reality and begins to replace it. Against Locke's picture of the mind as passive receiver, Blake insists that intelligibility requires participation: "General Forms have their vitality in Particulars." Reality is encountered in the specific, the embodied, the particular not in the abstraction that claims to represent it. Crucially, Blake's own art enacts what it argues: his images participate in the

disclosure of reality rather than representing it from outside, drawing the viewer into a mode of encounter that precedes conceptual explanation.

The third movement engages Heidegger's *The Question Concerning Technology*. Heidegger diagnoses the way modern technology reduces the real to standing-reserve - ordering beings as resources to be unlocked, stored, and switched about, concealing their intrinsic presences beneath utility. The merely instrumental view of technology, he insists, is itself part of the problem. Against this, he identifies *poiēsis* - the bringing-forth that lets presences come into unconcealment - and suggests that art may harbour the saving power that Enframing conceals. Yet Heidegger stops short. His framework risks reproducing a subtle abstraction from embodiment - repeating, at the level of ontology, the unmooring that the algebraicisation of geometry performed upon mathematical reasoning. Kierkegaard supplies the corrective: his account of participatory inwardness - most fully realised in the embodied ethical selfhood of *Either/Or* Book II - provides what Heidegger's framework cannot. Where Heidegger leaves us endangered and summoned, Kierkegaard and Blake together suggest what the saving power might actually feel like from the inside: not a different way of thinking, but a different way of being in and moving through the world.

Art as epistemic passage is knowledge that emerges through traversal rather than detached representation - keeping open the space in which reality exceeds the frameworks we bring to it.

Jad Bou Harfouch (American University of Beiruit):

The Machine Remembers what it cannot feel

Something strange happens when you watch Brazil (1985) now. Terry Gilliam's film does not appear as a failed prediction or a successful one, but as a vision of the future that has already done its cultural work. It shaped the visual and emotional vocabulary of dystopian cinema so thoroughly that later viewers inherit its language without inheriting the anxieties that produced it. Its influence becomes a kind of invisibility: the more a work shapes subsequent culture, the harder it may be for later audiences to feel what once made it urgent.

This is not simply about meanings fading over time. It describes a more specific condition: meanings survive while the lived worlds that animated them change. Cultural associations persist through references, aesthetic styles, archives, and data, but lose their capacity to be inhabited in the same way. Even ordinary symbols, such as the comic association between dogs and fire hydrants, can remain culturally available while becoming less immediately liveable.

AI represents an extreme form of this condition. It gathers and recombines cultural material at a scale no human memory can reach, but it does not live through the worlds that produced it. It becomes a system of preservation without inhabitation, returning archived culture as simulation. Drawing on Bakhtin's sense that meaning is bound to the conditions of its utterance, I argue that AI reshapes human imagination not by imagining itself, but by changing which inherited futures can still be felt.

Cailin Harris (University of Luxembourg):

Art for Art's Sake: Hegel, Technology, and the Preservation of Collective Freedom

Art for Art's Sake: Hegel, Technology, and the Preservation of Collective Freedom This paper seeks to expose the supreme role of art in confronting the implicit threat to human freedom posed by the rapid expansion of technological dependence. This is conducted, firstly, by

developing an alternative reading of Hegel's theory of aesthetics in line with contemporary interpretations of his philosophy of history. Secondly, the paper examines the nature of the threat posed by technology, arguing that its continued mediation of human life leads to a decline in social and political engagement. Left unchecked, this tendency undermines humanity's collective capacity and the ability to shape and navigate its future. Thirdly, it argues that art occupies a highly important role in resisting these effects since, through this Hegelian reading, it is an activity done for no specific end and, thus, cannot be ceded over to machines. Based on this unique characteristic, art stands as an imaginative process through which we can maintain an awareness of the necessary engagement in the world and an understanding of the social and political engagement required to improve and sustain it. The first section reconsiders the conventional interpretation of Hegel's theory of aesthetics in light of contemporary readings of his philosophy of history developed by thinkers such as Comay, Žižek, McGowan, Ruda and Malabou. These interpretations challenge the traditional view of Hegelian history as a linear and teleologically necessary progression, instead asserting a much more complex, retroactive and contingent process. Hegel's philosophy of art is mostly understood in line with the former as a necessary development that ultimately ends with thought coming to comprehend its freedom and, once this goal is achieved, arriving at the "end of art", so to speak. However, considering this theory in line with the latter, we are met with an internally fractured process, a theory of art that accounts for the potential regression of human progress or the chance that thought loses sight of its own freedom. In other words, there is no "end point" to art; it serves rather as a necessary activity to sustain an awareness of thought's constructive shaping of the world and thus a subjective awareness of the necessary active participation that must take place to maintain or improve a certain social or political context. The second section develops the claim that the increasing reliance on technology poses a serious threat to human freedom. As technology becomes increasingly capable of conducting tasks previously reliant on individual agency, there emerges a serious risk that collectively we lose sight of our fundamental role in maintaining, reproducing and transforming the social, political and institutional frameworks within which we participate. The central argument is that the continual displacement of intellectual labour by technology gradually diminishes collective identities and ideals necessary for social and political cohesion, which are the products of a highly complex and extensive historical process. The third section argues that this revised interpretation of Hegel's philosophy of art reveals the fundamental role art must assume in resisting these destabilising effects of increasing technological dependence. In contrast to most other forms of human activity, art resists being subordinated to technology since it is pursued for its own sake and thus cannot be organised around utility, efficiency, and instrumental ends. This is not to deny the fact that technology can play a role in artistic production; however, at the fundamental level, art as an activity cannot be transferred to machines like other tasks and activities. On this reading, the imaginative activity of art preserves a space within an increasingly technologically standardised world for thought to sustain an encounter with itself and thus to maintain an understanding of its implicit freedom and its shaping of the world. In doing so, it sustains the collective capacities required for social and political life by resisting the potentially corrosive effects of complete technological dependence. Thus, embedded within the act of creating art for art's sake lies the history of thought's sustained effort to give form to its world.

Caoimhe Hughes (University of Galway):

Can Analogue Photography Be An Attentive Practice?

In this paper I will argue that analogue photography can be used as an attentive practice. I will use Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch's definitions of attention and compare them with the

creative analogue photographic process outlined in Henri Cartier-Bresson's book "*The Decisive Moment*" to argue that elements required by the analogue photographic process to take *good* pictures contribute it to being an attentive practice. These elements include the physical and mental limitations of the process, the vulnerability required by the process and its relationality. Photography has always shifted between enabling a possessive, self-imposing relation to reality, while allowing a removal of the self in relation the world. What I hope to do in this paper is present an alternative way of using the camera, not as an extension of the self but as a space that facilitates a sort of separation of self and in doing so, allows us to attend to the world more fully, both with and without a camera.

Attention, is at its core, truth seeking. I argue that the camera can never reveal the truth or the essence of a subject but can only reveal the truth of the moment; this truth being its impermanence. In seeking to fix the impermanent permanently, what is revealed is not the truth of the subject but through it, it is found the futility of trying to fix the self as something permanent and unitary in an impermeant reality. What happens to the self during attention is trying to classify the unclassifiable, to fix the impermanent permanently. If the self is there or not there during attention that doesn't matter, having a fixed view it is still an attachment. I argue that we must let go of any fixed ideas about the nature of self in relation to attention as this allows us to direct our consciousness fully outward.

I will now outline three elements of the analogue photographic process that help cultivate attention: 1. **Limitations:** I argue that the limitations of the analogue photographic process help make it an attentive practice. One limitation being the finite number of exposures on a roll of film. Unlike digital photography where any number of photos can be taken and stored, the limitation of the analogue format forces the photographer to attend more carefully to the process. 2.**Vulnerability:** Like attention, the analogue photographic process requires a surrender. In attention you surrender yourself to a reality you cannot control. In analogue photography you cannot see the end product immediately, you must surrender and trust in the process, with no guarantee of results. 3. **Relationality:** Attention and analogue photography are about our relations to the world and to others. Your conception that you are impressing yourself upon reality is displaced and in turn you learn reality can impress itself upon you. In analogue photography as an attentive practice, the subject reveals itself to you, the subject captures you- but only when you pay attention.

Analogue photography, at the very least, functions as an attentive practice because it encourages us to look outward, to direct our consciousness onto something other than ourselves, if only momentarily. Seeing the world as it takes effort, and we often shy away from that effort, but seeing, *truly* seeing something as it is an act of absolute love. The illusion of a permeant self alienates us from an impermeant reality. To combat this alienation, we must confront this selfish fear and embrace reality. The function of analogue photography as an attentive practice is not to create great art (although I argue, it follows good photographs comes from true attention) or to serve as validation. It is to dispel the illusion of the self as a fixed, unitary agent and through that, allows reality to be, without the interference of our fantasies, our projections, and our fixed classifications. It can paradoxically reinforce the illusion of permeance, while also fighting the illusion. We must exist within and embrace this tension to be able to truly see.

Tomás Lally (Independent Academic):

We Need to Talk about the Artificiality of Artificial Intelligence

This paper argues for a reframing of the way in which we discuss and converse about Artificial Intelligence and critiques the growing and widespread tendency to anthropomorphise AI. It emphasises the need to challenge the dangerous identification of Artificial Intelligence with human intelligence, and the identification of machine outputs as moral outputs. In *As If Human: Ethics and Artificial Intelligence*, Nigel Shadbol and Roger Hampson explore the ethical challenges posed by artificial intelligence. Their central argument is that we should assess AI actions or outputs as if they came from a human being, thereby ensuring that decisions made by AI are fair and transparent. In the book they develop basic design principles for building 'moral machines'. On the face of it, this may look like a useful strategy for developing human-centric AI. However, in emphasising the human characteristics of AI, applying human standards of accountability to machines and ascribing a quasi-moral status to their outputs, their argument supports the well established practice of anthropomorphising AI. The 'if' in 'as if' like the word 'artificial' in artificial intelligence has been effectively overlooked. The thrust of the argument is focused on treating machine 'decisions' and outputs as human outputs.

There is a clear sense in which machine outputs by themselves are morally neutral, the morality attaches to how we deploy or indeed allow a machine to deploy these outputs. Machines are best understood as programmed and programmable devices which process large amounts of data and produce outputs based on their programming and the data inputs. While many agree with this view and have labelled the anthropomorphising of AI as hype and fallacious, others are expending considerable intellectual energy on questions regarding whether we will soon need to consider according human rights to robots and machines which behave in a human-like way. The anthropomorphising aspect of the Shadbolt / Hampson argument needs to be robustly challenged as does treating AI outputs as if they came from a human being. The outputs need to analysed and assessed by human beings applying moral principles rather than being treated as quasi-moral outputs by a machine.

AI models like ChatGPT, Gemini and chatbots like Claude are programmed devices. Their ability as powerful and super efficient research and data processing tools is unquestionable. However, engaging with their constructed and programmed ability to simulate and mimic human responses and pose as social companions, while entertaining and fun, is correctly understood as in the region of entertainment and game playing, similar to a child creating a drama with a programmed speaking doll. It is clearly not a substitute for real human company and socialisation. Parameters have become blurred because of the widespread tendency to forget about the artificiality of AI and credit it with original intelligence and/or consciousness as Richard Dawkins recently did. Dawkins who deftly and militantly avoided *The God Delusion* seems to have succumbed to the AI delusion with his conclusion that AI is probably conscious even if it doesn't know it.

In comparing artificial intelligence to human intelligence it is clear that we are using an analogy. We are stating that artificial intelligence shares some similarities with some aspects of human intelligence. This is not anthropomorphising AI, it is acknowledging a similarity. St. Thomas Aquinas used his theory of analogy in relation to God. Effectively to steer a middle path between anthropomorphism and agnosticism. He wished to maintain that God was not reducible to a perfect human but also was not completely other. Artificial Intelligence is like human intelligence in some ways but is different also. The understanding of the term intelligence as analogous prevents us from anthropomorphism and overidentification. AI is correctly viewed as an assistive technology capable of enhancing human

decision making and does not replace the need for oversight and constant vigilance, in fact it heightens the need. We can attempt to bias proof algorithms, improve the quality and provenance of data and the transparency of data processes but the only way to ensure that the outputs of AI systems align with human values and ethics is by maintaining human regulation, governance and oversight all the way from design to output. The anthropomorphising of AI or the treatment of its outputs as if they are human outputs is not a helpful move in safeguarding our future relationship with AI.

Felix McCormick (University of Galway):

Art and Schizophrenia: Imagination and World

Bryan Charnley spent much of his personal life hampered by mental illness. It, however, is the confluence of his particular experience as a schizophrenic with his medium of visual art that provides us an opening into the exploration of a trait so essential to art.

Imagination, even at the level of non-fiction, is at the heart of the artistic process; in the case of those worlds distorted by schizophrenia, the contours through which we understand what is 'imaginary' begin to become less clear. In Paul Ricoeur's Lectures on Imagination (2024), he discusses two primary modalities of imagination: 'reproductive' imagination (discussed in reference to Ryle and Sartre), a kind of imagination that remains inexorably attached to a referent, such that the distinction between imagination and perception lies primarily in the mode of givenness; 'productive' imagination, then, is that which is 'fictional', and as Ricoeur puts it: "seems to be nonreferential in the sense that it has no object", such that it is endowed with a power to push the limits of the world in which it exists, and that "a new kind of reference may be opened thanks to the absence of an original" (Ricoeur, 2024, 220). Within the paradigm of imagination, where does Charnley stand: the references which are so clear and real to him are, at least in the gravity with which he experiences them, imperceptible to us. For Charnley, what is so real is for us a fiction, and a fundamentally different sort of reference. What does the distinction in imagination that Ricoeur describes say about the possibility of access, empathy, and understanding for the insane and sane alike?

Sophie McNamara (University College Dublin):

Metamorphosis: How Ovid and Kafka warn us about becoming post-human

The question; 'what is it to be human?' is one which has been discussed since early philosophy. As society transforms and the world around us changes, so do our definitions. In this essay, I will discuss the themes of transformation found in Ovid's 'Metamorphoses' and Kafka's 'Metamorphosis'. I will analyse how the device of transformation is used to express themes of posthumanism in these texts. My main goal in this essay is to convey how Ovid and Kafka use metamorphosis to explore what it means to be human. Through transformation and change, characters become alienated from their humanity. I will relate this to some posthumanist scholarship, specifically the works of Roden and Braidotti cited below. I will argue that as we become posthuman, we become alienated from our humanity.

Firstly, I will discuss some posthuman scholarship and define some terms / schools of thought that will be explored in this essay. I will then explore two tales of transformation in Ovid and the transformation in Kafka's metamophosis, and analyse the use of the device of transformation within the two texts. I will relate the theme of transformation in these texts to the themes found in posthuman scholarship. Finally, I will then conclude my main argument that is; as one transforms and becomes posthuman, one becomes alienated from their humanity.

This essay concludes by questioning whether the loss of our humanity forewarned in posthuman transformation should be mourned at all, given that human existence, (per the existentialists) precedes any essential definition.

Teresa Moreno Olmeda (Carlos III University of Madrid):

"One Wing in the Mud, the Other in the Sky": Reclaiming Utopia through Spanish Prospective Fictions in Blueprints for the Future

In a time of polycrisis and a sensation of impending doom, human imagination often retreats into dystopia. This paper explores an alternative imaginative trajectory through the lens of *Borradores del futuro* (*Blueprints for the Future*), a Basque-based creative project that commissions prospective fictions anchored in existing socio-ecological alternatives, which invites us to reflect on the possible role of utopia in addressing contemporary crises.

Unlike classical utopias -such as More's *Utopia* or Christine de Pizan's *The City of Ladies*-, often operated as "no-places" outside of history, *Blueprints for the Future* anchors its narratives in concrete, territorialized alternatives (e.g., self-managed neighbourhoods, feminist urbanism projects or cooperative farms that are already in motion in the Basque Country). These stories, written predominantly by women, use these initiatives as the "seeds" for fiction, making their narratives collapse the distance between the "now" and the "not-yet".

Thus, in contrast to the pejoratively connotated notion of utopia as "impossible" in its colloquial sense, this project focuses on fictions about truly possible worlds, perhaps what Bloch referred to as "concrete utopias". Here, we do not find the comprehensiveness of modern utopias, but rather stories of no more than 30 pages that seek to leave an impression, a mark on the imagination. What matters here, then, is not whether one agrees or disagrees with the proposed institutional models, but whether the utopian experiment is indeed disruptive with regard to the nature of the present, which is otherwise taken for granted. In this sense, the aim of the stories is to facilitate a "re-education of desire", as William Morris puts it.

The project's approach to technology is particularly revealing. While techno-utopian contemporary narratives (see, for example, Kim Stanley Robinson's *The Ministry for the Future*) often frame science as a panacea for ecological collapse, *Blueprints for the Future* rejects technological solutionism. Instead, its fictions prioritise care networks, cooperative governance, and low-tech resilience, reflecting a scepticism toward green capitalism and a preference for embodied, relational temporalities. Here, technology is not a driver of change but a contested tool within broader struggles for social and ecological justice.

Interestingly, the stories are published in a variety of open-access free formats (audiobooks, WhatsApp serializations, illustrated texts), which exemplifies how technologies may also democratise access to speculative thought. This range of options reflects an attempt to cater to fragmented consumption patterns in social media. Gender and intergenerationality are central to these utopian experiments. The stories subvert classical utopian silences (also found in works such as Bellamy's *Looking Backward* or Morris's *News from Nowhere*) by centering maternity, non-cisheteronormative relationships, and aging, particularly through female and queer perspectives. For instance, the story "Flowering perimeter", by Katixa Agirre, interrogates the commodification of reproductive labour in a self-managed community.

These narratives also embrace conflict as inherent to utopia, echoing critiques like Karl Popper's about the possibilities of utopia not only being counter-revolutionary, but also extremely dangerous in itself due to its potential to lead to totalitarianism. As one character notes: "All utopias claim their victims"; a recognition that even the most radical imaginaries

must grapple with dissidence and ethical dilemmas. Here they present a "post-carbon" imaginary that is not a frictionless paradise but a site of ongoing ethical labour. At the same time, the project's focus on localized alternatives invites reflection on the scalability and inclusivity of its utopian vision. While the emphasis on small-scale, community-based solutions offers a powerful critique of globalised, techno-centric approaches, it also raises questions about how these ideas might resonate beyond their immediate context. For instance, could these utopian imaginaries inspire broader change if they were integrated into narratives with wider appeal? Additionally, the project's scepticism toward technological solutions might overlook the ways in which such innovations could complement existing care networks, particularly in the Global South.

By analysing *Borradores del Futuro* as a living archive of prospective fictions, this paper argues that utopian thought today must be both grounded and aspirational; that is, as they say in the glossary of the project, "one wing in the mud, the other one in the sky". It also invites a dialogue on whether such localised, pluralistic imaginaries can scale to address global crises, or if their power lies precisely in their resistance to universality, offering instead a patchwork of possible futures.

Ananya Rajoo (University of Galway):

Art and the Possibility of Re-world-ing: Rethinking Artistic Disclosure and Existential Belonging in the Technological Age

Based on a contemporary interpretation of Heidegger's conception of art, in dialogue with Dewey's philosophy of art, this paper proposes an understanding of art as a process of un-world-ing and re-world-ing grounded in existential belonging and argues that this capacity to interrupt habitual spatial and temporal dispositions is crucial in an age of pervasive technological mediation. Within this framework, art operates through mutually generative movements. It unsettles habitual modes of everydayness while simultaneously opening the possibility to reground oneself in the world through alternative ways of attending, interacting, and being. This paper argues that artistic practice grounded in everyday lived experience, as sites of these mutually generative movements, create forms of resistance that interrupt and subvert the reductionist ways of meaning-making and understanding the world perpetuated by the technological paradigm. As technological mediation increasingly configures space as calculable coordinates oriented toward efficiency, and time as a variable to be optimised for productivity, artistic disclosure disrupts the spatial and temporal orientations reinforced by the technological paradigm. However, art and technology are not understood here as mutually opposing domains but as ways of meaning-making emerging within the fabric of everyday lived experience. Drawing on Heidegger's philosophy of technology, the paper understands technology as a mode of revealing that shapes how we understand and make sense of the world around us. As the technological way of being or the technological paradigm becomes increasingly prevalent, everyday lived experience is governed by a reductionist understanding of being, narrowing the possibilities through which humans encounter and understand the world. In this context, this paper reinvokes Heidegger's proposition of art as a site for fostering the saving power in the technological age and further builds on this preposition by developing a renewed understanding of art in contemporary times. In this paper, art and technology are approached as constitutively entangled within contemporary existence. This paper raises the question of how, within this entangled existence, artistic disclosure can open possibilities for alternative ways of revealing, attending, and being in the world. This question is central to the research project based on which this paper is developed. To answer this question, the research

project adopts an experimental, arts-based methodology. An art practice was created by the researcher to reflect on our relationship with the everyday world and the entities that make this world. This art practice took the form of an audio walk. In the walk, developed using a geo-located audio app, participants received audio cues at specific locations, as they freely drift through an outdoor space. The cues prompted them to pay attention to their body and movements and perform certain tasks that subvert habitual ways of paying attention and engaging with surroundings. Following the walk the participants reflected on their embodied experience of drifting, including the encounters and interactions, through journaling and other forms of art making. The data generated through these reflections were analysed to examine the structures of experience and meaning-making that shape participants' engagement with the everyday world. Rather than advancing either dystopian or utopian narratives about the contemporary hybrid reality, where virtual, physical, and biological spheres increasingly intermingle, this paper investigates how artistic practices can create space for critical reflection and attentional reorientation within technologically mediated environments. It argues that art can disclose otherwise obscured relations between humans, technologies, and environments, enabling renewed forms of understanding and inquiry.

Nikita Siverts (Freie Universität Berlin):

The Work of Creativity in the Age of Mechanical Production

In his essay "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction" Walter Benjamin discusses the value and function of visual art. He departs from the situation in which each work of art can be perfectly reproduced by technical means that require no artistic or creative engagement on the part of a human. The central question of his essay is whether it matters to the recipient whether the work of art is an original or a copy, and whether it should matter at all. Our situation today is very similar, with two exceptions. First, in the age of LLMs the issue concerns no longer just the visual arts, but anything that can be expressed through language. Second, the question is no longer whether something can be reproduced, but whether it is being produced in the first place. I will argue in this talk that in the current historical situation, LLMs are forcing every discipline that can in the broadest sense be described as symbolic or intellectual to reinvent itself in the same manner as the visual arts reinvented themselves in the 19th century. The challenge that LLMs present to all of our intellectual activities is analogous to the challenge that photography presented to the visual arts in the mid-19th century. The central thesis is that creative works are in the process to change being more human-orientated. In the first part I will systematically reconstruct the central argument of Walter Benjamin. This will consist in showing that by outcompeting humans in representation, photography enabled the visual arts to focus on their essence. Since that essence was far from obvious, the original challenge gave birth to heterogeneous schools (e.g. Impressionism, Cubism, Dadaism). By narrowing down to the very essentials, the visual arts found entirely new forms and — more crucially — found a new purpose, which lay (in most cases) in the expansion of perception. In the second part I will show how Benjamin's observation on photography applies to other fields that were previously reserved to human creativity and intelligence. To that end, I will focus specifically on the field of academic philosophy. I will argue that most everyday tasks as well as the established measures for qualifying and quantifying good philosophical research will change. Since LLMs can produce a large number of papers – and are becoming increasingly convincing in mimicking human authorship – writing will probably lose its chief significance. Similar to what photography did to the visual arts, LLMs will render it obsolete to produce an abundance of texts. This raises the question not only about academic philosophy as an institution, but also about what the goal of academic philosophy is. In the short third section I

will outline two approaches (which are by no means the only ones) by which academic philosophy could reinvent itself. One is a phenomenological approach, in which philosophy would focus on experience prior to its mediation by language. Another approach could be labelled deconstructive: the task of philosophy would be to show – in a method close to psychoanalysis – what the issue is that texts or individuals are attempting to express, but which they are always only circling around.

Férdia Stone-Davis (Dublin City University):

Tacit knowing and emotional understanding: what can music offer?

This paper considers the ability of tacit knowledge to contribute to theoretical knowledge by way of music and its ability to give felt shape to emotion concepts.

The first part of the paper sets out key terms in Michael Polanyi's account of tacit knowledge, showing how Polanyi locates tacit knowledge—as "personal" knowledge—in between "objective" and "subjective". Integral to this is the modality of tacit knowledge, which involves an epistemic and directional interplay between the "focal" and the "subsidiary". Simply put, this interplay is the recognition that our perception dynamically unfolds as it moves from the recognition of aspects of a thing to the whole of which it is part, and back again to its aspects (which are enriched as a result). As part of this, the significance of "indwelling" to knowledge is discussed.

The second part of the paper will illuminate Polanyi's account of tacit knowing by way of Iris Murdoch's suggestive remark about "concrete universals" in *The Sovereignty of the Good*, where she says that it may well be the case that all concepts are best understood as ideal end-points to towards which we move, but which we never completely grasp. This prepares further the ground for thinking about the potential for the contribution of tacit knowing to theoretical knowledge, specifically knowledge relating to emotions.

The third section considers how—if emotion is a complex of both thought and feeling—music might contribute to emotional knowledge. How this is so is given clarity through Peter Goldie's account of emotions, and is supplemented by Mark Wynn's suggestion that art provides opportunity for "affectively toned perception". Here, in line with Murdoch's idea that all concepts might usefully be cast as concrete universals (and in line with Polanyi), I suggest that music can facilitate affectively toned perception of emotions by giving musical sense and thereby felt shape to emotion concepts, extending our perception and understanding of them.

Giuseppe Torre (University of Limerick)

Dischronicities and the artistic self

In the realm of digital performance art, compound terms such as "live performance" and "real-time performance" are frequently employed, yet they function as oxymora hidden in plain sight. There exists indeed a tension between what "nowness" means for us and what "nowness" means for digital devices—and these two meanings do not match. Modern digital devices operate at speeds that vastly exceed our sensory thresholds for engaging with the nowness of our experiential register. They respond to input by returning seamlessly retrieved output, leading our senses to perceive immediacy in spite of any reasonable doubt. And yet, as we know, appearances can be deceiving. Is "just-in-time" truly sufficient from both an engineering and a perceptual standpoint, or does this sufficiency mask a deeper temporal disjunction? Does a merely technical efficiency of the response imply that these processes occur at the same time?

The reality is that in digital devices, time is dealt with at an ontological level fundamentally other than the one informing our own human experience. Crucially, this distinction appears unique to digital technologies, setting them apart from mechanical, electrical, and generally analogue systems. The central divergence lies in the relationship between time and reality. While analogue technologies measure the passing of time within a reality that remains, at its core, indifferent to its own count, digital time governs the very world it brings about through its own relentless ticktocking. In short, the world exists whether we clock it or not. For digital devices, however, clocking time is a necessary and intrinsic feature of the orderly count of all digital things that appear to our senses. However, counting something in time, non-trivially, takes its own time; hence, how does this delay fracture the illusion of immediacy? While we are affected by both temporal modes, there seem to be dramatic differences for our lived experience. The case presented in this intervention concerns our own gestural register. We know that knowing or measuring time influences how we experience it—inducing feelings of rush or scarcity—ultimately contributing to the neurosis described by thinkers like Bergson, Heidegger, and Byung-Chul Han. Yet our very existence does not depend on this measurement. We continue to live even without knowing the time; reality will not collapse. Whether we model our behavior on it remains a choice. Digital time, on the contrary, seems to dictate the very existence of the actions we perform in the digital domain by explicitly translating our gestures to the speed and grammar that the orderly count imposes upon them. From this perspective, as soon as we interact with and through the digital—a choice that increasingly feels like a constriction in our digital world—we effectively surrender ourselves to that rhythm. Digital time first abstracts from, and then concretises, the reality of our gesture, thereby transporting our gesture to a different ontological register: one grounded entirely on a counted time.Using the case of the digital artist and their practice, I will hence show the inner mechanisms leading to this onto-phenomenological clash of registers concerning our gesturality in a digital world. As the stringent cause-and-effect mechanisms of our gesture, bound to the silent flow of our experiential time (durée), are irreversibly broken by the contingency of a timely count that relentlessly attempts to close gaps through mere speed, one question comes to the fore: how does this clash shape the sense of the artistic self within digital art practices? By interrogating these temporal dissonances, I aim to uncover the consequences of a world where the count dictates the gesture, and where the "live" is forever mediated by the logic of the machine.

Xiaochen Zhao (Independent Academic)

The Undergone:Technics, Time, and the Aesthetics of the Imprint

In the ninth chapter of the *Poetics* Aristotle ranks poetry above history because poetry shows the universal, how a person of a kind would by probability or necessity act, while history holds to the particular, to “what Alcibiades did, or what was done to him.” The Greek sets ἔπραξεν beside ἔπαθεν, the deed beside the thing undergone. ἔπαθεν is the aorist of πάσχω; from the same stem come the noun πάθος and the category τὸ πάσχειν, being-affected, so that one root carries tragic passion and the grammar of taking a determination from without. When πάθος returns as the ruinous action, the pity and fear of the work hang on it. So a single passivity has two sites: a life undergoes all that befalls it, while a work, less obviously, holds the thing that once stood before it and pressed itself in. The universal, the range of the possible a kind could have lived, is drawn from real undergoing, so that a fictional πάθος undergoes the real by answering to it, and only so can it move us, keeping the impress of the real it was rendered from, the ground poetry’s autonomy stands on and disowns. This essay begins from that disowned ground, asking where in Greek thought it might be housed.

To house it is to claim that a work can mean by contact, owing nothing to resemblance or design, and Greek keeps three moments of such meaning:

- τύπος, the impression one body leaves in another by pressure, the wax of the *Theaetetus* into which perception sinks.
- σημεῖον, the mark read back to the absent cause that made it, the evidential sign of the *Rhetoric*.
- ὑπόμνησις, the same mark laid up in a support that outlasts it, the written memory the *Phaedrus* mistrusts.

A recording instrument is ὑπόμνησις made into a thing, and because it keeps more than was meant, it frees the having-been from intention. The same passivity falls to the work, which, given over to its occasion, means it as Grice's spots mean measles, naturally and factively, with no one intending it. The criterion is counterfactual, since the imprint alters whenever the occurrence does, so the image is as it is because the thing was, and for no other reason. Synthetic images, whose look is settled apart from any occurrence, forfeit this and mean only as a sentence does, by design, asserting a having-been that never was.

Such a recording holds a moment once open and now foreclosed, and by keeping that foreclosure it gives the imagination its object, the possibilities the instant held and lost. A person's death is the extreme case, kept as the profilmic real, the body and light before the lens, real even where the fiction around them is not. Barthes named this the *ça-a-été* and placed it outside art, the noeme a photograph must shed to become art. The pure judgment of taste should not care whether its object exists, and yet §42 of the third *Critique* finds it resting all along on an interest in the real existence of natural beauty, since the delight in the nightingale dies the instant its song proves a boy's imitation. There the imprint claims its beauty, the boy's contrived song standing for synthesis while the bird's stands for a mark only a living cause could leave.

Maggie Nelson's *Jane: A Murder* raises the killing of the poet's aunt from journals, newspapers, and the police file, and owes its force to those real imprints. Typing it would drain that force, filing Jane among the statistics as one more instance of her kind; the imprint instead holds the single life she might have lived. *Endless Idaho*, the twelve hours James Franco assembled with Gus Van Sant from footage *My Own Private Idaho* left on the floor, holds the real River Phoenix beneath the fiction of Mike: his luggage on the roadside, his narcolepsy carrying him into convulsions, an instant whose possibilities have closed over. That discarded footage draws its power from a moment kept and gone, one no finished work could furnish and no synthesis could feign, where we are given the closed past to imagine and feel the form all such loss must take. These works press a claim the *Poetics* could not grant, that a thing may matter in art because it happened, once, undergone by the work as a fate is undergone by a life, and that the imagination it stirs turns backward, upon the possibilities the real has shut.